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Summary 
 
The important feature of temporal model checking is the generation of 
counterexamples. In the report, the requirements for generation of counterexample 
(called critical tree) in model checking of CSM systems are described. The output 
of TempoRG model checker for QsCTL logic (a version of CTL) is presented. 
A contradiction between counterexample generation and state space reduction is 
commented. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The advantage of temporal model checking over other system verification techniques is that 
the result of any evaluation is guaranteed to be calculated in a finite time [Clar86, Clar89, 
McMi92]. Yet the result – if it is false – is not sufficient to localize errors in the project. 
The output of the temporal verifier should support the process of design improvement. The 
main weapon offered by the temporal verifiers against design errors is the ability to generate 
counterexample in a case of negative result of evaluation.  
 
Counterexamples are handy for many kinds of reasoning on concurrent systems. The simplest 
way is the redesign of the system that has been found to be erroneous. Other approach is 
automatic test generation for verified system [Amma98]. Counterexamples are also used to 
test the feasibility of errors found during model checking of abstract models of a system 
[Pasa01]. 
 
We will show the manner of finding counterexamples in “classical” evaluation algorithms 
(finding a fixed point of some functional and automaton-based evaluation). Then the rules of 
critical tree construction in the CBS algorithm [Dasz01] will be described. An example of the 
critical tree constructed by the TempoRG program [Dasz02] for example formula will be 
analyzed. It will be explained why the critical tree should be constructed over full state space 
rather than on reduced one. 
 
2. CRITICAL SEQUENCE AND CRITICAL SUBGRAPH IN 
“CLASSICAL” EVALUATION ALGORITHMS 
 
In the first group of “classical” methods of evaluation (based on finding a fixed point of some 
functional [McMi92, Jans98]), a special algorithm [Clar99] is used for finding (path 
quantifiers are skipped as the rules refer to both LTL and CTL): 
• a witness (a state in which a nested formula or formulas hold) when existential 
modality is used (F, Us) and the result is true, 
• a counterexample (a state in which a nested formula or formulas do not hold) 
when general modality is used (G, Uw, X, Xa) and the result is false. 
 
In order to provide a better insight into the verified system’s behavior, for every individual 
operator, a sequence of states should be found from the starting state of evaluation to: 
• F ϕ - a state in which ϕ holds (witness), 
• ϕ Us ψ - a state in which ψ holds (witness), and ϕ is satisfied from starting state 
to the predecessor of the witness, 
• G ϕ - a state in which ϕ does not hold (counterexample), 
• ϕ Uw ψ - a state in which neither ϕ nor ψ holds (counterexample), and ϕ is 
satisfied from starting state to the predecessor of the counterexample, 
• X ϕ - a successor of starting state in which ϕ does not hold (counterexample), 
• Xa ϕ - a state having projection onto a successor of starting state in automaton a, 
in which ϕ does not hold (counterexample). 
 
The algorithm is described to find a sequence of states from the starting state to the witness or 
counterexample [Clar99]. It will be referred to as a critical sequence. The disadvantage is 
that counterexamples are not defined for existential modality. Also, even for general modality 
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if the result is true, then counterexample is not defined (yet the formula may be negated and 
the positive result may be negative in fact). 
 
Other evaluation methods (tableau for LTL [Jans98, McMi92, Vard96] or alternating 
automata for CTL and CTL* [Kupf98, Viss97, Viss00, Vard98]) are based on the product of 
the specific automaton (representing the negation of desired feature) with the state space of 
the system. If the product is not empty, it is simply the image of all improper behaviors 
(following the “wrong behavior” automaton). It is the critical graph rather than a critical 
sequence. The advantage of this method is that the critical graph is obtained as a “side effect” 
of the evaluation [Clar99]. The disadvantage is that the size of the critical graph may be very 
large and hard to analyze (for example, if AG ϕ is evaluated and only a few states actually 
hold ϕ, the critical graph contains almost all the state space). Moreover, it is hard to extract 
the parts of critical tree responsible for given subformulas. The size of the counterexample 
may be reduced by choosing a single path in the critical graph arbitrarily. 
 
3. CRITICAL TREE IN CBS ALGORITHM 
 
A special attention was paid to the construction of counterexample in CBS evaluation method 
[Dasz01]. It cannot be obtained as easy as in tableau method. The second difficulty comes 
from optimizations: the state in which it is decided that the formula is false need not be 
exactly the state not satisfying the nested formula.  
 
The assumptions made for finding the critical subgraph are the following: 
• only false result of verification gives the critical tree; 
• subgraphs responsible for all subformulas influencing the total false result have to 
be found (regardless of type of modalities and with negations possible); 
• only one sequence for every element of the formula (atomic Boolean formula or 
an operator) is presented to the designer; 
• the tree begins in the starting state s0; 
• the state finishing the sequence for embracing formula starts the sequence for 
nested formula (sequences must “stick”); 
• for two-argument operators (Uw, =>, * etc.), if both arguments influence the 
result, sequences for both are presented (for example in a case of ϕ=>ψ formula 
negatively evaluated – it should be explained why the left argument ϕ is true and 
why ψ is false). 
 
The above requirements assure that the critical subgraph has the form of the critical tree 1). 
For every operator and every desired result: false or true (opposite to the actual result) 
the construction of the sequence and rules for the arguments are defined. The rules are 
collected in the table below. 
 
No Formula Desired 
result 
(opposite to the 
actual result) 
State finishing the 
sequence 
Desired result for 
arguments in the state 
finishing the sequence 
1 ¬ϕ false starting state s0 true 
                                                 
1)
  The result may not be a ‘regular’ tree in fact (a state may occur in more than one sequence). But it is really 
the tree if we take as elements of the tree the sequences responsible for individual subformulas, indexed by 
identifiers of these subformulas (see Fig. 2). 
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2 ¬ϕ true starting state s0 false 
3 ϕ+ψ false starting state s0 ϕ false if it is true 
ψ false if it is true 
4 ϕ+ψ true starting state s0 ϕ true 
ψ true 
5 ϕ*ψ false starting state s0 ϕ false  
ψ false 
6 ϕ*ψ true starting state s0 ϕ true if it is false 
ψ true if it is false 
7 ϕ=>ψ false starting state s0 ϕ opposite to the actual 
result  
ψ opposite to the actual 
result 
8 ϕ=>ψ true starting state s0 ϕ false  
ψ true 
9 ϕ<=>ψ false starting state s0 ϕ opposite to the actual 
result  
ψ opposite to the actual 
result 
10 ϕ<=>ψ true starting state s0 ϕ opposite to the actual 
result  
ψ opposite to the actual 
result 
11 AX ϕ false any successor of s0 
holding ϕ 
false 
12 AX ϕ true any successor of s0 not 
holding ϕ 
true 
13 AXa ϕ false any successor of s0 
in automaton a, holding ϕ 
false 
14 AXa ϕ true any successor of s0 
in automaton a, not 
holding ϕ 
true 
15 AF ϕ false any state holding ϕ  false 
16 AF ϕ true any member of strongly 
connected subgraph in 
which ϕ is not satisfied 
true 
17 AG ϕ false starting state s0 false 
18 AG ϕ true any state not holding ϕ  true 
19 A(ϕUw ψ) false any state holding ϕ and ψ 
or a state holding ϕ, 
last in a cycle (before s0) 
ϕ false  
ψ false if it is true   
20 A(ϕUw ψ) true any state holding neither ϕ 
nor ψ 
ϕ true  
ψ true   
21 s0: ϕ false the state s0 false 
22 s0: ϕ true the state s0 true 
23 ∀ s∈S; ϕ   false any state of S satisfying ϕ false 
24 ∀ s∈S; ϕ   true any state of S true 
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not satisfying ϕ 
25 ∃ s∈S; ϕ   false any state of S satisfying ϕ false 
26 ∃ s∈S; ϕ   true any state of S  
not satisfying ϕ 
true 
 
The program TempoRG [Dasz02] that evaluates temporal formulas, constructs also the 
critical tree. To do this, the evaluation is performed for the second time with the optimizations 
disabled: 
• The sequence must begin in the specific state: the state finishing the sequence for 
embracing operator. Therefore the evaluation must not be performed for many 
states simultaneously.  
• The sequence must end in a state appointed by the rules for the given operator 
(see the table). But the optimization that prevents evaluation of a subformula for 
a given states many times collecing the results of evaluation for future usage. 
For example, during the evaluation of s0:AF ϕ it may be stored in the data 
structures that the formula AF ϕ is false in the whole future of the state s0 and the 
evaluation terminates. But the rules of building the sequence say that a state 
belonging to a strongly connected subgraph must be found, and s0 may not be the 
member. Therefore, this oprimization should be turned off. 
• The critical tree must explain why the subformula gives the erroneous result. 
In normal evaluation, if the factor is false then the other factor of the conjunction 
need not be evaluated. But during the construction of the critical tree it must be 
checked if both factors give false result, and if so, why. This leads to the 
conclusion that lazy evaluation should not be applied. 
 
Having the starting state of the sequence s specified and the ending state s’ found, the 
sequence of states between them should be calculated. It is done in two steps: 
1. Using CBS rule, the sequence of spheres2 [Dasz01] is constructed from s: 
• SRC={s}∪FUT(s) 
• cond1=s’ in sphere; cond1res does not care 
• cond2=true; cond2res does not care 
2. Having found the sphere SPHn(s); the backtracking is performed: any predecessor 
in the sphere SPHi-1(s) of the chosen state in the sphere SPHi(s) is teken. For the 
sphere SPHn(s) the state s’ is chosen. The sequence of chosen states in spheres 
from SPH0(s) to SPHn(s) is just the searched sequence from s to s’. 
 
4. EXAMPLE 9 – THE SIG PROTOCOL 
 
The tests of COSMA environment [Cwww] are performed on the model of SIG [Grab99] 
protocol used in the plant monitoring system. The model consists of 25 automata and it 
contains over 14 000 states and over 32 000 arcs. The following formula was evaluated 
(general path quantifiers A are skipped as in the input of TempoRG program [Dasz02], 
because the quantifier E is not used in QsCTL, see Section Błąd! Nie moŜna odnaleźć 
źródła odwołania.): 
 
                                                 
2)
 A sphere is a set of states reachable by given number of arcs from s. Sphere SPH0(s) consists of the state s 
itself. Sphere SPH1(s) contains successors of state s (other than s). Sphere SPHi(s) contains these successors 
of states belonging to SPHi-1(s) which do not belong to ‘previous’ spheres SPHj(s), j<i). Thus, any sphere 
SPHi(s) contains states reachable from state s by i arcs, excluding states belonging to spheres SPHj(s), j<i. 
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∀ s ∈ {SocketSocket.notConnected};  
(X ¬ CGVar) Uw  
(((¬ CStartVal) * (¬ (in SocketSocket.notConnected))) Uw SetVarsOkFlg) ■ 
 
Note. The following notation is used for operators in the present report and in the 
TempoRG interface: 
Operator Report TempoRG 
Boolean negation ¬ ! 
conjunction * * 
disjunction + + 
state p in automaton a a.p a.p 
staying in state s in s in s 
signal x being generated x x 
next state (modality) X N 
weak until (modality) Uw U 
general path quantifier (implied) (implied) 
general state quantifier ∀ A 
state variable s s s 
 
The meaning of the formula is irrelevant; the only important feature is that the formula is 
quite complicated and contains several two-argument operators (Uw, *, Uw) 
 
The parsing tree of the formula is 
presented in Fig. 1. Nodes of the tree 
are numbered following the left order. 
From now on, every feature raletd to 
given subformula will be marked with 
its number.  
 
The result of evaluation is false, and 
according to the rules presented in the 
table, a critical tree is constructed. 
Sequences for nodes     and     are not 
constructed since the values of these 
subformulas are just as desired or do 
not influence the result.  
 
As the sequences must “stick” in the 
tree, the tree may be presented as in 
Fig. 2. The sequences are represented 
as edges of the tree. A node of the tree 
corresponds to the state that finishes 
the preceding sequence shown above it 
(except for the root) and starts the 
sequences below it (except for the 
leaves).  
 
∀ 
Uw 
X 
 
Uw 
* 
SetVars 
OkFlg 
¬ ¬ 
Cstart 
Val 
in … 
¬ 
CGVar 
10 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 11 
12 
Fig. 1. Example parsing tree 
8 9 
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The following rules were used during the construction of the critical tree (numbers refer to the 
table of rules): 
 
Node Rule Desired result of 
left argument 
Desired result of 
right argument 
∀ 
24  
true 
Uw 
20 
true true 
X 
12  
true 
¬ 
2  
false 
CGVar 
   
Uw 
20 
true true 
* 
6 
true (and is) true 
¬ 
not constructed 
(value as desired) 
  
CstartVal 
not constructed 
(not reached by 
the algorithm) 
  
¬ 
2  
false 
in SocketSocket.NotConnected 
   
SetVarsOkFlg 
   
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
2 
3 6 
4 
5 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
6 7 12 
8 10 
11 
12 
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Because there are many single-state sequences consisting of the same state in the tree 
(for example four sequences consists of the state s4), the tree may be compressed. Fig. 3 
shows the compressed tree. Multi-state 
sequences (for temporal operators) are 
represented as edges of the tree. Single-state 
sequences are contained in nodes.  
 
The critical tree generated by the TempoRG 
program has one of four possible views: 
• states, 
• states in automata, 
• signals, 
• XML [Bray98]. 
 
The picture of the views is presented below. 
In the first three views, the program outputs the 
parsing tree in an indent form (every level of the 
tree increments indentation). A sequence for an 
operator is listed below it. All states in the 
sequence are marked “OK” except the last one 
marked “ERROR”. 
 
“States” view (Fig. 4) shows states of the state 
space as the elements of the sequence. 
 
“States in automata” view (Fig. 5) shows 
columns representing individual automata. 
Names of automata are shown in the header. 
In every column, the state in the automaton is 
shown only if it changes in comparison to the 
previous global state.  
 
“Signals” view (Fig. 6) is similar to states in 
automata view, but names of local states are 
replaced by names of signals generated in states. 
Names of automata “listening” to the signal 
follow the name of signal. The automaton listens 
to the signal if the signal is present in a formula 
on a label of any arc outgoing from the current 
state. As before, the header contains the names 
of automata. 
 
The last output form is “XML” view (Fig. 7). It 
is the synthesis of the three previous forms: 
global states, states in automata and signals 
generated and observed are shown. The output is 
organized in XML format. Fig. 7 contains the 
structure of the XML view and the fragment of 
example critical tree. 
 
Fig. 2. Critical tree 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
10 
11 
12 
1 
s1 
s1 
s2 
s3 
s3 
s3 
s4 
s4 
s4 
s4 
s4 
1 
2 
3 
4 5 
6 
7 10 
11 12 
Fig. 3. Compressed 
critical tree 
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In the TempoRG program, a critical tree is calculated automatically after the negative result of 
evaluation is achieved. The designer decides on the view of the tree. Basing on the contents of 
the critical tree, the designer may follow the sequence and identify the reason of the error 
found. It is the most important practical support for the designer, which allows her/him to 
redesign the system fixing the incorrect behavior. 
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  A  (false): 
                        ERROR   PasswordOkFlgOff:idle:idle:idle:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:Pro … 
   U (false): 
                        OK      PasswordOkFlgOff:idle:idle:idle:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:Pro … 
                        OK      PasswordOkFlgOff:idle:idle:idle:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:Pro … 
                        OK      PasswordOkFlgOff:idle:idle:idle:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:Pro … 
                        OK      PasswordOkFlgOff:idle:idle:idle:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:Pro … 
                        OK      PasswordOkFlgOff:idle:idle:idle:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:Pro … 
                        OK      PasswordOkFlgOff:idle:OnConnectAck:idle:idle:PasswordSendFl … 
                        OK      PasswordOkFlgOff:idle:idle:idle:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:Pro … 
                        OK      PasswordOkFlgOff:idle:idle:idle:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:Pro … 
                        OK      PasswordOkFlgOff:idle:idle:idle:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:Pro … 
                        OK      PasswordOkFlgOff:idle:idle:idle:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:Pro … 
                        OK      PasswordOkFlgOff:idle:idle:idle:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:Pro … 
                        OK      PasswordOkFlgOff:idle:idle:idle:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:Pro … 
                        OK      PasswordOkFlgOff:idle:idle:idle:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:Pro … 
                        OK      PasswordOkFlgOff:idle:idle:idle:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:Pro … 
                        OK      PasswordOkFlgOff:idle:idle:idle:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:Pro … 
                        OK      PasswordOkFlgOff:idle:idle:SetPassOkFlg:idle:PasswordSendFl … 
                        OK      PassOkFlgOn:idle:idle:signal:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:ProtVe … 
                        OK      PassOkFlgOn:idle:idle:signal:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:ProtVe … 
                        OK      PassOkFlgOn:idle:idle:signal:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:ProtVe … 
                        OK      PassOkFlgOn:idle:idle:signal:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:ProtVe … 
                        OK      PassOkFlgOn:idle:idle:signal:OnSignalAck:PasswordSendFlgOff … 
                        ERROR   PassOkFlgOn:idle:idle:signal:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:ProtVe … 
     N (false): 
                        OK      PassOkFlgOn:idle:idle:signal:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:ProtVe … 
                        ERROR   PassOkFlgOn:idle:idle:signal:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:ProtVe … 
       ! (false): 
                        ERROR   PassOkFlgOn:idle:idle:signal:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:ProtVe … 
         CGVar (true): 
                        ERROR   PassOkFlgOn:idle:idle:signal:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:ProtVe … 
     U (false): 
                        OK      PassOkFlgOn:idle:idle:signal:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:ProtVe … 
                        OK      PassOkFlgOn:idle:idle:signal:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:ProtVe … 
                        OK      PassOkFlgOn:idle:idle:signal:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:ProtVe … 
                        OK      PassOkFlgOn:idle:idle:signal:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:ProtVe … 
                        OK      PassOkFlgOn:idle:idle:signal:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:ProtVe … 
                        OK      PassOkFlgOn:idle:idle:signal:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:ProtVe … 
                        OK      PassOkFlgOn:idle:idle:OnRecAck:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:Prot … 
                        OK      PassOkFlgOn:idle:idle:idle:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:ProtVerO … 
                        OK      PassOkFlgOn:idle:idle:idle:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:ProtVerO … 
                        OK      PassOkFlgOn:idle:idle:idle:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:ProtVerO … 
                        OK      PassOkFlgOn:idle:idle:idle:OnSignalAck:PasswordSendFlgOff:P … 
                        OK      PassOkFlgOn:idle:idle:idle:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:ProtVerO … 
                        OK      PassOkFlgOn:idle:idle:idle:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:ProtVerO … 
                        OK      PassOkFlgOn:idle:idle:idle:OnSignalAck:PasswordSendFlgOff:P … 
                        OK      PassOkFlgOn:idle:idle:idle:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:ProtVerO … 
                        OK      PassOkFlgOn:idle:idle:idle:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:ProtVerO … 
                        OK      PassOkFlgOn:COnClose2Ack:idle:idle:OnSignalAck:PasswordSend … 
                        OK      PasswordOkFlgOff:idle:idle:idle:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:Pro … 
                        OK      PasswordOkFlgOff:idle:idle:idle:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:Pro … 
                        OK      PasswordOkFlgOff:idle:idle:idle:OnSignalAck:PasswordSendFlg … 
                        OK      PasswordOkFlgOff:idle:idle:idle:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:Pro … 
                        OK      PasswordOkFlgOff:idle:idle:idle:idle:PasswordSendFlgOff:Pro … 
                        ERROR   PasswordOkFlgOff:idle:idle:idle:OnSignalAck:PasswordSendFlg … 
       * (false): 
                        ERROR   PasswordOkFlgOff:idle:idle:idle:OnSignalAck:PasswordSendFlg … 
         !: OK or void 
         ! (false): 
                        ERROR   PasswordOkFlgOff:idle:idle:idle:OnSignalAck:PasswordSendFlg … 
           in SocketSocket.notConnected (true): 
                        ERROR   PasswordOkFlgOff:idle:idle:idle:OnSignalAck:PasswordSendFlg … 
       SetVarsOkFlg (false): 
                        ERROR   PasswordOkFlgOff:idle:idle:idle:OnSignalAck:PasswordSendFlg … 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
10
11 
12
operator 
result 
states in 
sequence
erroneous 
state
name of 
state 
node in 
parsing 
tree 
Fig. 4. „States” view 
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                              PasswordOkFlag  |PasswordOnClose|PasswordOnConnect|PasswordOn … 
  A  (false): 
                        ERROR PasswordOkFlgOff|idle           |idle             |idle       … 
    U (false): 
                        OK    PasswordOkFlgOff|idle           |idle             |idle       … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |OnConnectAck     |           … 
                        OK                    |               |idle             |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |SetPassOkF … 
                        OK    PassOkFlgOn     |               |                 |signal     … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        ERROR                 |               |                 |           … 
      N (false): 
                        OK    PassOkFlgOn     |idle           |idle             |signal     … 
                        ERROR                 |               |                 |           … 
        ! (false): 
                        ERROR PassOkFlgOn     |idle           |idle             |signal     … 
          CGVar (true): 
                        ERROR PassOkFlgOn     |idle           |idle             |signal     … 
      U (false): 
                        OK    PassOkFlgOn     |idle           |idle             |signal     … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |OnRecAck   … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |idle       … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |COnClose2Ack   |                 |           … 
                        OK    PasswordOkFlgOff|idle           |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        OK                    |               |                 |           … 
                        ERROR                 |               |                 |           … 
        * (false): 
                        ERROR PasswordOkFlgOff|idle           |idle             |idle       … 
          !: OK or void 
          ! (false): 
                        ERROR PasswordOkFlgOff|idle           |idle             |idle       … 
            in SocketSocket.notConnected (true): 
                        ERROR PasswordOkFlgOff|idle           |idle             |idle       … 
        SetVarsOkFlg (false): 
                        ERROR PasswordOkFlgOff|idle           |idle             |idle       … 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
10
11
12
operator 
result 
states in 
sequence
erroneous 
state
name of 
automaton 
node in 
parsing 
tree 
separator 
name of 
state in 
automaton state in 
automaton 
does not 
change 
state in 
automaton 
changes 
Fig. 5. „States in automata” view 
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                              PasswordOkFlag               |PasswordOnClose                 … 
  A  (false): 
                        ERROR                              |                                … 
    U (false): 
                        OK                                 |                                … 
                        OK                                 |                                … 
                        OK                                 |                                … 
                        OK                                 |                                … 
                        OK                                 |                                … 
                        OK                                 |                                … 
                        OK                                 |                                … 
                        OK                                 |                                … 
                        OK                                 |                                … 
                        OK                                 |                                … 
                        OK                                 |                                … 
                        OK                                 |                                … 
                        OK                                 |                                … 
                        OK                                 |                                … 
                        OK                                 |                                … 
                        OK                                 |                                … 
                        OK    PassOkFlg ->VariablesOnReceiv|                                … 
                        OK    PassOkFlg ->VariablesOnReceiv|                                … 
                        OK    PassOkFlg ->VariablesOnReceiv|                                … 
                        OK    PassOkFlg ->VariablesOnReceiv|                                … 
                        OK    PassOkFlg ->VariablesOnReceiv|                                … 
                        ERROR PassOkFlg ->VariablesOnReceiv|                                … 
       N (false): 
                        OK    PassOkFlg ->VariablesOnReceiv|                                … 
                        ERROR PassOkFlg ->VariablesOnReceiv|                                … 
         ! (false): 
                        ERROR PassOkFlg ->VariablesOnReceiv|                                … 
           CGVar (true): 
                        ERROR PassOkFlg ->VariablesOnReceiv|                                … 
      U (false): 
                        OK    PassOkFlg ->VariablesOnReceiv|                                … 
                        OK    PassOkFlg ->VariablesOnReceiv|                                … 
                        OK    PassOkFlg ->VariablesOnReceiv|                                … 
                        OK    PassOkFlg ->VariablesOnReceiv|                                … 
                        OK    PassOkFlg ->VariablesOnReceiv|                                … 
                        OK    PassOkFlg ->VariablesOnReceiv|                                … 
                        OK    PassOkFlg ->VariablesOnReceiv|                                … 
                        OK    PassOkFlg ->VariablesOnSignal|                                … 
                        OK    PassOkFlg ->VariablesOnReceiv|                                … 
                        OK    PassOkFlg ->VariablesOnReceiv|                                … 
                        OK    PassOkFlg ->VariablesOnReceiv|                                … 
                        OK    PassOkFlg ->VariablesOnReceiv|                                … 
                        OK    PassOkFlg ->VariablesOnReceiv|                                … 
                        OK    PassOkFlg ->VariablesOnReceiv|                                … 
                        OK    PassOkFlg ->VariablesOnReceiv|                                … 
                        OK    PassOkFlg ->VariablesOnReceiv|                                … 
                        OK    PassOkFlg ->VariablesOnReceiv|COnClose2Ack ->SocketSocket, Cl … 
                        OK                                 |                                … 
                        OK                                 |                                … 
                        OK                                 |                                … 
                        OK                                 |                                … 
                        OK                                 |                                … 
                        ERROR                              |                                … 
        * (false): 
                        ERROR                              |                                … 
          !: OK or void 
          ! (false): 
                        ERROR                              |                                … 
            in SocketSocket.notConnected (true): 
                        ERROR                              |                                … 
        SetVarsOkFlg (false): 
                        ERROR                              |                                … 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
10
11
12
operator 
result
states in 
sequence
erroneous 
state
name of 
automaton 
node in 
parsing 
tree 
separator 
name of 
signal
addressee 
no signal 
generated 
Fig. 6. „Signals” view 
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<TREE_ELEM LEVEL=”level in the parsing tree” PHRASE=”operator in the node”> 
 <STATE STATUS=”OK/ERROR” NAME=”state name”> 
  <AUTOMATON NAME=”automaton name” LOCAL_STAE=”name”> 
   <SIGNAL NAME=”signal name”> 
    <TO AUTOMATON=”automaton name”/> 
    <TO AUTOMATON=”automaton name”/> 
    <TO AUTOMATON=”automaton name”/> 
   </SIGNAL> 
   <SIGNAL NAME=”signal name”> 
    <TO AUTOMATON=”automaton name”/> 
    <TO AUTOMATON=”automaton name”/> 
   </SIGNAL> 
  </AUTOMATON> 
  <AUTOMATON NAME=”automaton name” LOCAL_STAE=”name”> 
   <SIGNAL NAME=”signal name”> 
    <TO AUTOMATON=”automaton name”/> 
   </SIGNAL> 
  </AUTOMATON> 
 </STATE> 
 <STATE STATUS=”OK/ERROR” NAME=”state name”> 
  <AUTOMATON NAME=”automaton name” LOCAL_STAE=”name”> 
   <SIGNAL NAME=”signal name”> 
    <TO AUTOMATON=”automaton name”/> 
   </SIGNAL> 
  </AUTOMATON> 
 </STATE> 
</TREE_ELEM> 
<TREE_ELEM LEVEL=”level in the parsing tree” PHRASE=”operator in the node”> 
 <STATE STATUS=”OK/ERROR” NAME=”state name”> 
  <AUTOMATON NAME=”automaton name” LOCAL_STAE=”name”> 
   <SIGNAL NAME=”signal name”> 
    <TO AUTOMATON=”automaton name”/> 
etc. 
 
EXAMPLE        : 
 
<TREE_ELEM LEVEL="4" PHRASE="!"> 
     <STATE STATUS="OK" NAME="PasswordOkFlgOff:idle:idle:idle:OnSignalAc…"> 
          <AUTOMATON NAME="PasswordOkFlag" LOCAL_STATE="PasswordOkFlgOff"> 
          </AUTOMATON> 
          <AUTOMATON NAME="PasswordOnClose" LOCAL_STATE="idle"> 
          </AUTOMATON> 
          <AUTOMATON NAME="PasswordOnConnect" LOCAL_STATE="idle"> 
          </AUTOMATON> 
          <AUTOMATON NAME="PasswordOnReceive" LOCAL_STATE="idle"> 
          </AUTOMATON> 
          <AUTOMATON NAME="PasswordOnSignal" LOCAL_STATE="OnSignalAck"> 
          <SIGNAL NAME="COnSignal2Ack"> 
               <TO AUTOMATON="SocketSignal"/> 
          </SIGNAL> 
          </AUTOMATON> 
          <AUTOMATON NAME="PasswordSendFlag" LOCAL_STATE="PasswordSendFl…"> 
          </AUTOMATON> 
          <AUTOMATON NAME="ProtVerOkFlg" LOCAL_STATE="ProtVerOkFlgOff"> 
          </AUTOMATON> 
          <AUTOMATON NAME="ProtVerOnClose" LOCAL_STATE="idle"> 
          </AUTOMATON> 
… 
 
sequence 
OK or 
ERROR state in 
automaton 
signal 
addressee 
state 
operator 
automaton 
10
Fig. 7. „XML” view 
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5. SEQUENCE DIAGRAMS 
 
To facilitate the further analysis of evaluation results, the XML form may be easily processed 
by external programs that make further analysis of results of evaluation. For example, UML 
[OMG99] sequence diagrams may be easily constructed directly from XML output. 
The sequences for subformulas      and     are presented in the form of sequence diagrams in 
Figs. 8 and 10 (Fig. 8 contains also a table translating names of automata to codes for 
simplifications of the next figures; Fig 9 contains the explanation of the elements of 
a sequence diagram contained in the circle on the left of Fig. 8). Names of signals are not 
shown for readability. In the sequences, many signals are generated in the same state, so it 
may be difficult to observe which signals belong to the specific state. To simplify this task, 
short segments on the left separate distinct states.  
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Fig. 9 Explanation of elements of sequence diagrams 
(on the example of Fig. 8) 
 16 
 
In the sequences in which signals are generated continuously state by state, they may be 
presented as wide arrows like in Fig. 11. 
 
 
6. CRITICAL TREE VERSUS STATE SPACE REDUCTION 
 
State space reduction (Chapter Błąd! Nie moŜna odnaleźć źródła odwołania.) should not be 
used in combination with searching for a critical tree. The reduction of state space skips the 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 6 
    Fig. 10. Sequence diagram 6 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 6 
   Fig. 11. Other presentation of sequence diagram 6 
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states which give the same value of atomic Boolean formulas and the sequences of states in 
which given signals are not generated – are compressed to a single state. This makes the 
critical tree rather useless. To illustrate this observation, the following formula was evaluated 
over reduced state space: 
 
∀ s ∈ {SocketSocket.notConnected};  
(¬ CGVar) Uw  
(((¬ CStartVal) * (¬ (in SocketSocket.notConnected))) Uw SetVarsOkFlg) ■ 
 
Numbers of nodes in the parsing tree are preserved from the previous example (the node       
does not exist in the present example). A sequence in critical tree may be presented as 
a sequence diagram (like the ones in Figs. 8 and 10), where the signals passed between 
component automata clearly explain the reason of improper system behavior. For example, 
a sequence of signals obtained from the state sequence       is listed below.  
 
In the sequence, states are numbered from 1. If no signal is passed between automata in the 
state, only the number of the state is present (as in the case of states 1, 3, 11, …). If many 
signals are passed, they are listed one under another (as in the case of states 17, 18, 19, …). 
Every signal passed between automata is presented as: 
 
source_automaton --{ name_of_signal }--> destination_automaton 
 
The sequence is as follows: 
 
1.  
2. SocketSocket -–{ COnConnect1 }--> ProtVerOnConnect 
3.  
4. ProtVerOnConnect –-{ COnConnect1Ack }--> SocketSocket 
5. SocketSocket –-{ COnConnect2 }--> PasswordOnConnect 
6. PasswordOnConnect –-{ COnConnect2Ack }--> SocketSocket 
7. SocketSocket –-{ COnConnect3 }--> VariablesOnConnect 
8. VariablesOnConnect –-{ COnConnect3Ack }--> SocketSocket 
9. SocketSocket –-{ COnConnect4 }--> ValuesOnConnect 
10. ValuesOnConnect –-{ COnConnect4Ack }--> SocketSocket 
11.  
12.  
13. SocketSocket –-{ COnRec1 }--> ProtVerOnReceive 
14. ProtVerOnReceive –-{ COnRec1Ack }--> SocketSocket 
15. SocketSocket –-{ COnRec2 }--> PasswordOnReceive 
16. PasswordOnReceive –-{ SetPassOkFlg }--> PasswordOkFlag 
17. PasswordOkFlag –-{ PassOkFlg }--> VariablesOnReceive 
PasswordOnReceive –-{ Signal2 }--> SocketSignal 
18. PasswordOkFlag –-{ PassOkFlg }--> VariablesOnReceive 
SocketSignal –-{ COnSignal1 }--> ProtVerOnSignal 
19. PasswordOkFlag –-{ PassOkFlg }--> VariablesOnReceive 
ProtVerOnSignal –-{ COnSignal1Ack }--> SocketSignal 
20. PasswordOkFlag –-{ PassOkFlg }--> VariablesOnReceive 
SocketSignal –-{ COnSignal2 }--> PasswordOnSignal 
21. PasswordOkFlag –-{ PassOkFlg }--> VariablesOnReceive 
PasswordOnSignal –-{ COnSignal2Ack }--> SocketSignal 
22. PasswordOkFlag –-{ PassOkFlg }--> VariablesOnReceive 
SocketSignal –-{ COnSignal3 }--> VariablesOnSignal 
23. PasswordOkFlag –-{ PassOkFlg }--> VariablesOnReceive 
SocketSignal –-{ SetSigFlg }--> SocketSignalFlag 
VariablesOnSignal –-{ SetVarsSendFlg }--> VariablesSendFlag 
 
2 
3 
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From the sequence one can easily observe how the automaton SocketSocket operates 
groups of other automata responsible for given phases of establishing the connection 
(ProtVer, Password, Variables, Values) and how the automaton SocketSignal takes 
over this role from state 18. However, the reduction of state space skips the states which give 
the same value of atomic Boolean formulas and the sequences of states in which given signals 
are not generated are compressed to a single state. In our example, the sequence     in reduced 
state space is presented in Fig. 12. 
 
 
The signals passed between automata in the sequence are: 
 
1.  
2. SocketSocket -–{ COnConnect1 }--> ProtVerOnConnect 
23. PasswordOkFlag –-{ PassOkFlg }--> VariablesOnReceive 
SocketSignal –-{ SetSigFlg }--> SocketSignalFlag 
VariablesOnSignal –-{ SetVarsSendFlg }--> VariablesSendFlag 
 
Three states are preserved in reduced state spave out of original 23 states, because: 
• the subformula in SocketSocket.notConnected is true in state 1, and false in states 
2-23 of the original sequence; 
• the subformula CGVar is true in state 23 and false in states 1-22; 
• all other atomic formulas do not change value along the original sequence. 
 
The new sequence says nothing interesting about the actions that lead to the erroneous state at 
the end of the path. Therefore, after negative evaluation of the formula over reduced state 
space, it should be evaluated once again over original state space (and without optimizations) 
to find a critical tree.  
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the report, a concept of construction of critical trees for negatively evaluated temporal 
formulas is presented. Generation of couterexapmples decides of the strength of model 
checking methods. The designer is informed not only on the existence of fault, but she/he is 
also precisely informed of the sequence of actions that leads to the erroneous state. The rules 
for critical tree generation are defined in a way that gives the designer maximum information 
about the fault. Especially the division of counterexample into sequences responsible for 
individual operators is useful in redesign of the verified system.  
 
Based on the critical tree, a sequence diagram [OMG99] of error prone message exchange 
may be visualized, or error simulation over a graphical state space may be executed. The 
TempoRG program outputs the counterexample in a form that may be easily converted to the 
 
    Fig. 12. Sequence diagram      in reduced state space 2 
2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
2 
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graphical form of sequence diagram or simulated dynamically as state changes in a fragment 
of RG. Such a result analyzer is planned in the COSMA environment. 
 
References 
 
[Amma98] Ammann P.E., , Black P. E., Majurski W.,1998, “Using Model Checking to 
Generate Tests from Specifications”, Proc. 2nd IEEE Int. Conf. on Formal 
Engineering Methods (ICFEM'98), Brisbane, Australia (Dec 1998), Staples J., 
Hinchey M. G., and Liu S. (eds.), IEEE Computer Society, pp. 46-54. 
[Bray98] Bray T., Paoli J., Sperberg-McQueen C, 1998, Extensible markup language 
(XML) 1.0, http://www.w3c.org/TR/REC-xml, W3C Recommendation 
[Chan98] Chan W., Anderson R. J., Beame P., Burns S., Modugno F., Notkin D., 
Reese D., 1998, “Model checking large software specifixations”, IEEE 
Transactions on Software Engineering, SE-24(7), Jul 1998, pp. 498-520 
[Clar86] Clarke E. M., Emerson E. A., Sistla A. P., 1986, “Automatic Verification of 
Finite State Concurrent Systems Using Temporal Logic Specifications”, ACM 
Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems, 8(2) (April 1986), 
pp. 244-263 
[Clar89] Clarke E. M., Grumberg O., Kurshan R. P., 1989, “A Synthesis of Two 
Approaches for Verifying Finite State Concurrent Systems”, in Proc. Of 
Symposium on Logical Foundations of Computer Science: Logic at Botik ’89, 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science vol. 363, Springer-Verlag, New York 
[Clar99] Clarke E. M., Grumberg O., Peled D., 1999, Model Checking, MIT Press 1999 
[Cwww] http://www.ii.pw.edu.pl/cosma 
[Dasz00] Daszczuk W. B., 2000, “State Space Reduction For Reachability Graph of 
CSM Automata”, Institute of Computer Science, WUT, ICS Research Report 
No 10/2000 
[Dasz01] Daszczuk W. B., 2001, “Evaluation of Temporal Formulas Based on Checking 
By Spheres”, Proc. Euromicro Symposium on Digital Systems Design – 
Architectures, Methods and Tools, September 4-6, Warsaw, Poland, pp. 
158-164 
[Dasz02] Daszczuk W. B., 2002, „Verification of Temporal Properties in Concurrent 
Systems”, PhD Thesis, Warsaw University of Technology 
[Grab99] Grabski W., Daszczuk W. B., Mieścicki J., Dobrowolski H., 1999, „Verication 
of Event Protocol of Establishing and Closing of a Connection in ESS 
System”, Institute of Computer Science, WUT, ICS Research Report No 10/99 
[Holz97] Holzman G. J., 1997, The model checker SPIN, IEEE Transactions on 
Software Engineering, SE-23(5), May 1997, pp. 279-295 
[Jans98] Janssen G. L. J. M., 1998, “Logics for Digital Circuit Verification: Theory, 
Algorithms and Applications”, PhD thesis, Eindhoven University of 
Technology, 1998 
[Kupf98] Kupferman O., Vardi M. Y., 1998, "Weak Alternating Automata and Tree 
Automata Emptiness", in Proc. of 30th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of 
Computing, Dallas, Texas, USA, May 23-26, 1998. ACM, pp.224-233 
[McMi92] McMillan K. L., 1992, “Symbolic Model Checking, An Approach to the State 
Explosion Problem”. PhD thesis, School of Computer Science, Carnegie 
Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, 1992 
[OMG99] OMG, Unified Modeling Language Specification, Version 1.3, June 1999 
[Pasa01] Păsăreanu C.S., Dwyer M. B., Visser W., 2001, “Finding Feasible Counter-
examples whan Model Checking Abstracted Java Programs”, 
 20 
Conf. Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems 
TACAS 2001, Genova, Italy, April 2-6, 2001, LNCS 2031, p. 284 
[Vard96] Vardi M. Y., “An Automata-Theoretic Approach to Linear Temporal Logic”, 
in Logics for Concurrency, Lecture Notes in Computer Science vol. 1043, 
Springer-Verlag, New York, 1996, pp. 238-266 
[Vard98] Vardi M. Y., “Sometimes and Not Never Re-revisited: On Branching Versus 
Linear Time”, in Proc. of 9th International Conference on Concurrency 
Theory, CONCUR 1998, Nice, France, September 8-11, 1998, Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science vol. 1466, Springer-Verlag, New York, 1998, pp. 1-17,  
[Viss97] Visser W., Barringer H., Fellows D., Gough G., Williams A., “Efficient CTL* 
Model Checking for Analysis of Rainbow Designs”, in Proc. of CHARME ’97, 
Montreal, October 1997, pp. 128-145 
[Viss00] Visser W., Barringer H., “Practical CTL* Model Checking: Should SPIN be 
extended?”, in International Journal on Software Tools for Technology 
Transfer Vol. 2 (2000) No 4, Special Section on SPIN, pp. 350-365 
 
